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Abstract  
  
The world is growing increasingly complex and is characterised by ever increasing 
interdependence. This is the argument Grevi holds to assess the evolving structure of the 
international system in order to accommodate new evolutions in international relations and 
societies around the world, which he conceptualises as ‘interpolarity’. In order to avoid systemic 
crises, growing powers will be required to avoid the use of conflictive power and to increasingly 
rely on cooperative methods, such as multilateral summitry, to create durable solutions. The 
EURussian energy relations are taken as a case example in this dissertation to assess whether, on 
the one hand, elements of interpolarity are indeed increasingly becoming apparent in both 
powers’ bilateral relations. On the other, to assess the prospects of the EU as a power under the 
interpolar system and whether it would truly be able to contribute. This is done through a review 
of EU-Russian economic and political energy relations over the past decade. It will become 
 
 
evident that the EU and Russia are existentially interdependent and that both powers have 
repeatedly reiterated on the need for cooperation. However, this process is often interrupted by 
short-term economical or political energy power concerns. In the third section I review 
assertions of the second section and argue that it can indeed be argued that EU-Russian energy 
relations can present signs of a coming interpolar system. With regard to the EU’s position within 
that system, much will depend on its ability to further unify its external policy and its ability to 
develop solid cooperative platforms. In the case of its position as an energy power, considerable 
progress could follow the successful completion of the EU-Russian 2050  
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“Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-
states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their  
preeminence as well. [...] Power is now found in many hands and in many places.” 1  
R. Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity  
  
The question of ‘power’ has dominated the International Relations debate since the origin of 
the discipline. This led authors such as Morgenthau, to contend that “International Politics, like all 
politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is 
always the immediate claim.”2 Power, here, is described as both the literal use of force, such as 
economic and military force, and the general ability to influence the behaviour of other states. 3 
The balance of power which, according to traditional thought, rises from repeated usage of 
power of states against other states, is conceptualised as the prime mechanism which counters 
the anarchic nature of the international system and prevents the rise of a single state as a 
hegemon within the international system.34 In the second half of the 20th century, this was 
thought, by a majority of academics, to lead into a bipolar situation. Waltz contended that this 
was most likely the most stable configuration of the international system, as both great powers 
were thought to counteract each other’s build-up of power.5   
                                                             
1 HAASS (R.). “The Age of Nonpolarity – What will follow US dominance”, in: Foreign Affairs. May-June 2008,  
Vol. 87(3), p. 45  
2 rd 
 MORGENTHAU (H.J.). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 3 Edition, Knopf, New York, 
1960, p. 29 3  SHEEHAN (M.). Balance of Power: History and Theory. Routledge, London and New York, 1996, p. 
7-8  
3 See ZINNES (D.). “An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories”, in: Journal of Peace Research. Vol.4,  
4 , pp. 270-85 and ZINNES (D.). “Coalition Theories and the Balance of Power”, in: GROENINGS (S.), KELLEY (E.W.) 
& LEISERSON (M.) (Eds.). The Study of Coalition Behaviour. Holt, Reinhart & Winston, New York, 1970 &KAPLAN 
(M.). “Rules for the Balance of Power System”, in: WILLIAMS (P.), GOLDSTEIN (D.), SHAFRITZ (J.). Classic 
Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations. 3rd Edition, Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont, 
2006, p. 109  




Through mutual deterrence, Mearsheimer argued, the number of great-power conflict is fewer 
and the international system becomes easier to operate.6  
 The end of the Cold War announced the end of the bipolar system and introduced renewed 
academic debate regarding the structure of the international system. Proponents of unipolarity 
argued that the system had evolved into a context of American dominance, a system “in which 
one state has significantly more capabilities than any other [... and] cannot be threatened by 
others.”7 Others argued that unipolarity was a mere illusion and that the system was already 
evolving into a context of multipolarity, or according to some a hybrid form of uni- 
multipolarity.89  
 More recently, however, the proliferation of new interpretations of the structure of the 
international system has become notable. These attempts at reimagining the configuration of the 
international system question the core basics of its structure by arguing that the properties and 
core composition of the basic units, and they way they are interlinked, of the international 
system have changed. The vast majority of contemporary economic, social and political problems 
stem from large-scale forces, such as globalization and increasing interdependence, which make 
any individual national-interest based efforts to redress these problems inadequate.10 These 
authors wish to address these inadequacies by contending that new interpretations of the 
structure of the international system should incorporate evolutions such as these large-scale 
forces.   
                                                             
6 MEARSHEIMER (J.J.). “Back to the future. Instability in Europe after the Cold War”, in: International Security. 
Summer 1990, Vol. 15(1), p. 14-15  
7 JERVIS (R.). “Unipolarity”, in: World Politics. Vol. 61, No. 1, 2009, p. 191. See also WOHLFORTH (W.C.). “The 
Stability of a Unipolar World”, in: International Security. Vol. 24, No.1, Summer 1999, pp. 5-41  
8 SNYDER (G.H.). Alliance Politics. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1997, p. 18 & LAYNE (C.). “The  
Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, in: International Security. Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993, pp. 5-51 & 
HUNTINGTON (S.P.). “The Lonely Superpower”, in: Foreign Affairs. Vol. 78, No. 2, March/April 1999, p. 36, see 
also FRIEDBERG (A.L.). “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia”, in: International Security. Vol.  
9 , No.3, 1993/4, pp. 5-33; JOFFE (J.). “’Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after  
Bipolarity”, in: International Security. Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 94-117  





Haass’s argument that states are increasingly giving way to a variety of types of new actors can 
be located within this trend.11 It would be precursory, however, to argue that the important role 
of states within the international system has already passed.   
 This realisation motivated G. Grevi to develop the concept of Interpolarity. Grevi argues that a 
process of redistribution of power at the global level, leading to a multipolar international 
system, combined with a trend of deepening interdependence, are the two basic dimensions of 
the transition away from the post-Cold War world.11 Within the interpolar world, major powers 
of the world will be inclined to use cooperative multi- and bilateral measures, or positive power, 
to avoid deadlocks within the international system and to avert existential threats posed by 
global problems. In this regard, Grevi defines the economical, energy and environmental issues as 
the prime challenges the international system will have to face in the coming decade.12 Grevi, 
having discussed his framework, raises the question of whether the EU will be able to rise to the 
challenge as a steering actor within the interpolar world. While Grevi’s interpolarity is 
dominantly state-oriented, he contends that the European Union (EU) has access to a sufficient 
range of policy tools and powers to become a prospective global power.  
Considering Grevi’s claims, this dissertation wishes to analyse the strength of his 
framework by analysing two interdependent powers of the evolving international system – the 
EU and Russia – and their respective policy responses to one of the major systemic challenges 
defined by Grevi: energy policy cooperation. In the process, this dissertation also wishes to assess 
in a thorough manner whether the EU truly meets the requirements to rise to the challenges 
posed by the interpolar system. As such, this dissertation will pose the following questions: First, 
how well does the interpolarity framework hold when analysing the case study of Euro-Russian 
energy relations? In this regard, it is important to address what elements of the Interpolar 
framework are already apparent in these relations.   
                                                             
11 HAASS (R.). Op. Cit., pp. 44-56 11  GREVI (G.). The Interpolar World: A new scenario. Occasional Paper, No. 79, 
EU-Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2009, p. 5  




Second, if the international system is indeed moving towards a configuration characterised by 
interpolarity, how well is the EU energy security policy prepared for this context? Related to this 
issue is the question of what role the EU will be able to play within the context of interpolarity.   
  
To answer these questions, this dissertation will undertake a double-tracked approach. 
The first chapter will deconstruct the interpolar framework in order to be able to better outline 
the specific characteristics of the interpolar international system, to come to a more detailed and 
thorough understanding of the concept. By the end of the chapter, I will very briefly assess two 
advantages the EU could hardness under interpolarity. However, it remains clear that the EU will 
have to face and overcome the challenge of unifying its external policy should it wish to become a 
leading power within the interpolar system.   
In the second chapter, this dissertation will take a case study example, namely the EU’s 
energy relations with Russia, and use the core elements of Grevi’s framework, discussed in 
chapter 1, as a guideline for assessing these evolutions. As a result, specific emphasis will be put 
on the interdependent, cooperative or bi-/multilateral nature of these relations. First, a closer 
look will be taken at the economic nature of the EU-Russian energy context in order to highlight 
the truly existential nature of interdependence between both powers. Additional attention will be 
given to Russia’s economic energy policies in this regard as well as its relations between the 
government and national energy firms. Second, this chapter will scrutinise the evolution of the 
EU’s external energy policies with regard to Russia in order to make certain assessments on the 
cooperative or conflictive nature of these relations.   
The final chapter will combine points from the first two chapters to present conclusions 
regarding the plausible advent of the interpolar system and the manner in which EU-Russian 
energy relations can be characterised in this regard. The claim will be made that the EU is at the 




contend that EU-Russian energy relations are strongly characterised by the use of positive 
power, but that this is intermittently disrupted by brief uses of negative power,   
often due to more the more general political context. Inversely, I will also claim that EU-Russian 
energy policy behaviour shows strong signs of the nascent development of an interpolar system, 
but that further research into other policy areas and power relations will be required to make 
definite claims. Grevi’s framework, however, provides a strong framework to analyse current 
























1. Deconstructing Interpolarity  
  
 I.  Cooperative Multipolarity  
  
In recent years, an increasing body of literature has attempted to re-evaluate the 
characteristics of multipolar systems in order to reassess their potential instability. The 
economic development of China, the G20 and India, the further political development of the 
European Union and the increasing self-assertion of the South-American countries and Russia as 
well as the fact that these evolutions have been happening in a peaceful manner provided 
indications that multipolarity might not be as unstable as was previously assumed.13 Classical 
realists already contended that multipolar systems were more stable than bipolar systems 
because powers are able to enhance their positions through alliance creation and limited wars, 
which not directly challenge others.14 Neorealists inverted this formula and and claimed that 
“powers within a multipolar system must focus their fears on any number of other powers and, 
misjudging the intentions of other powers, unnecessarily compromise their security.”15 As national 
interests are difficult to ascertain, rapid power shifts can be produced within and between 
coalitions and making it increasingly complex to manage crises. This, it is argued, is less likely in 
a bipolar system. Deutsch and Singer concluded on this subject that “in the long run [...] 
multipolar systems operating under the balance of power policies are shown to be self-destroying” 
due to an “accelerated rise of interaction opportunities” and consequently the “accelerated 
diminution in the allocation of attention”.15 As a result of the increased movements of power 
                                                             
13 WADE (R.). “Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and 
the IMF”, in: Politics & Society. September 2011, Vol. 39(3), p. 351; There is no agreement on when exactly the  
United States started experiencing a decrease in power or presence. For varied opinions, see: KEGLEY (Ch.) & 
RAYMOND (G.). A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century. Macmillan Press,  
Hampshire, 1994, p. 3-66 & 166-190; WALLERSTEIN (I.). “Precipitate Decline: The Advent of Multipolarity”, in: 
Harvard International Review. Spring 2007, pp. 54-59  
14 TOJE (A.). The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
2010, p. 164 15  Ibidem, p. 164-5; Relative power depends greatly on how respective powers define their 
national interests.  
15 DEUTSCH (K.) & SINGER (J.D.). “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability”, in: World Politics. Vol. 




within the international system, Thompson argues, crises are expected to be more common 
under multipolarity than other system configurations.17 These crises, in turn, according to 
Powell, are less likely to be resolved and are more likely to lead to war.18  
The absence of war between modern powers in the past two decades, the growing 
number of international institutions and the increasing importance of trans-, sub- and 
supranational formations as well as the increasing influence nonstate actors has led authors and 
policymakers to review existing perspectives of multipolarity in an effort to describe the nature 
of the ‘modern’ developing multipolarity. According to Toje, this effort largely finds a place 
between what H. Morgenthau has described as “the two extremes of over-rating the influence of 
ethics upon international politics or underestimating it by denying that statesmen and diplomats 
are moved by anything but considerations of material power.”19 Wendt asserted in this regard that 
modern multipolarity should be defined by process than structure, which would imply a great 
increase of the odds of multipolar peace. In the line of this argument, self-help of units in the 
international system is defined from their interaction, and not from anarchy.20  
These efforts have also led to a re-examination of the role states play as dominant actors 
within the international system and to a considerable move away from existing state-oriented 
models of world politics. Rosenau provides a two-world conception of the international system 
wherein both a state-centric and multi-centric world coexist simultaneously in order to describe 
the dynamics of ‘postindustrial interdependence’. “For the multi-centric world, while not a society, 
also lacks an overall design, derives from multiple sources, and is marked by high degrees of  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
SHAFRITZ (J.). Classical Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations. 3rd Edition, Thomson 
Wadsworth, Belmont, 2006, p. 108  
17  THOMPSON (W.). “Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare”, in: Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. Vol. 30(4), 1987, p. 587-615 & TOJE (A.). Op. Cit., p. 165  
                                                                                                                                                                                      




18  POWELL (R.). “Stability and the Distribution of Power”, in: World Politics. Vol. 48(2), p. 239-267  
19  MORGENTHAU (H.J.). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Knopf, New York, 
1973, p. 236; TOJE (A.). Op. Cit., p. 166 20  WENDT (A.) “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics”, in: International Organization”, Vol. 46, 1992, pp. 391-425  
diversity, decentralization, and dynamism that render coordination difficult.”16 The goal here is not 
to replace the existing state-centric system with the multi-centric variant. Rosenau acknowledges 
that states still maintain a crucial role within international politics, an interchange of both 
systems would imply that “Either states dominate world affairs or they do not, [...], so that positing 
them as dominant in one world and merely active in the other is yielding to old analytic habits”.17 
His goal is, therefore, to expand the existing analytical framework to incorporate the increasing 
variety of types of actors in the international system and to characterise the types of relations 
these actors develop18   
The main realisation behind this line of thought is that the international system is 
increasingly being subjected to power shifts which not only weaken the dominance of the great 
powers within that traditional system, but also herald the arrival of new types of centres or poles 
of power within said system.24 As such, these variations to the traditional, state-centric 
multipolarity, possibly better defined as neomultipolarity, aim to highlight the increasingly 
interdependent nature of the international system in order to put to light the influence nonstate 
actors can have on international policy creation and international power balance. This does not 
necessarily imply that the ‘Age of States’ has come to an end. It rather implies that states are 
increasingly forced to acknowledge and engage with other types of actors international affairs. 
Neither does it necessarily imply an immediately progressive perspective of the future of the 
international system. For example, a more competitive perspective on modern multipolarity is 
provided by Kagan.   
                                                             
16 ROSENAU (J.). “The Two Worlds of World Politics”, in: WILLIAMS (P.), GOLDSTEIN (D.) & SHAFRITZ (J.). Op.  
Cit., p. 115; For a more comprehensive account of his framework, see: ROSENAU (J.N.). Turbulence in World 
Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990, pp. 480  
17 ROSENAU (J.). Op. Cit., p. 118  
18 Ibidem, p. 119 24  Also see ZAKARIA (F.). The Post-American World. W.W. Norton, New York, 2008 & 
KUPCHAN (C.). The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First 




He provides a pessimistic vision of a modern multipolarity without multilateralism,19 where 
rising powers will seek to improve their relative positions and establish hegemony along their 
borders, and in turn reinstitutes a classical realist’s notion of the balance of power system.20   
  
Within the framework of interpolarity, Grevi presents cooperative multipolarity as the 
defining configuration of the developing world order. According to Grevi, the international 
system is growing increasingly heterogeneous and complex.21 Simultaneously, power is globally 
shifting unevenly across different dimensions which results in an asymmetric distribution of 
power. This, in turn, affects the ability of each major player to pursue interests independently of 
others.22 The political implications of this asymmetric distribution are problematic because not 
all sources of power equally convert into political influence. In this regard, Grevi argues that 
Haass was correct in noting that “power and influence are less and less linked in an era of 
nonpolarity.”29 While power can currently be characterised as being diffuse, Grevi argues that 
states individually have been able to increase their relative influence in critical domains beyond 
the traditional domains of high politics, such as national energy companies, sovereign wealth 
funds and protectionist tendencies in order to strengthen their position contra other 
international players.23 Traditional multipolarity only partially captures the dimensions of the 
modern, interdependent international environment because it “emphasises changes affecting the 
relative power and the scope for balancing and competition among poles of power. [...][Power, in 
this sense,] cannot only be measured relative to that of others, but should also be assessed relative 
                                                             
19 UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. US GPO, 
Washington D.C., 2008, available at: www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf; also 
see TOJE (A.). Op. Cit., p.169  
20 KAGAN (R.). The Return of History and the End of Dreams. Knopf, New York, 2008, p. 3-5  
21 GREVI (G.). The Interpolar World: A new scenario. Occasional Paper, No. 79, EU-Institute for Security Studies,  
Paris, 2009, p. 12  
22 Ibidem, p. 17 29  This is a direct reference to the influence nonstate actors can attain without directly having 
access to traditional forms of power. HAASS (R.). “The Age of Nonpolarity – What will follow US dominance”, 
in: Foreign Affairs. May-June 2008, Vol. 87(3), p. 47; See GREVI (G.). Op. Cit., p. 19  




to the changing level playing field of international relations and to the prevailing perceptions and 
expectations therein.”24  
Grevi categorises two varieties of power available to actors within the modern multipolar 
system. First, ‘negative power’ – the power to deny others the fulfilment of their objectives – has 
become increasingly important because it accelerates the appearance of diverging interests of 
the major powers within the international system. This is largely due to the asymmetric 
distribution of power and resources, described above. As this context induces traditional modes 
of national interest-based competition for power and influence – which are decreasingly linked to 
each other – on a global scale, the power of denial ultimately leads to a context of mutual 
constraint between the involved actors. While the use of negative power might deliver short-
term, its use also results in a ‘deadlock’ of international policy areas and subsequently hinders 
sustainable development and cooperative problem-solving which are required to deal with 
systemic issues. These hindrances, in turn, result in the appearance of long-term instability and 
risks.25 Grevi concludes that “These are risks that the international community can hardly afford at 
a time of flux when multipolarity is taking shape and interdependence is deepening.”26  
In order to overcome this dystopian perspective of international relations, Grevi proposes 
that, due to the increasing importance of interdependency within the multipolar system, ‘positive 
power’ is a better alternative to overcome systemic crises. As the international system is 
arguably moving away from uni-multipolarity to multipolarity proper as defined by 
Huntington,34 the cooperation of all major powers is required to address systemic challenges at 
the global or interregional level.27 This is partially due to the fact that the international system is 
marked by deepening, existential interdependence.28   
                                                             
24 Ibidem, p. 24  
25 Ibidem, p. 19-21  
26 Ibidem, p. 21 34  HUNTINGTON (S.P.). “The Lonely Superpower”, in: Foreign Affairs. Vol. 78, No. 2, 
March/April 1999, pp. 3549  
27 GREVI (G.). Op. Cit., p. 23  




Positive power is exerted through the engagement of actors through bi-/multilateral 
frameworks, be it through institutions or summits, or smaller-scale intergovernmental meetings. 
Crucially, these engagements should overcome traditional balance-of-power-induced deadlocks 
through dialogue between these blocs with the goal of overcoming short- to long-term effects of 
negative power usage.   
If we return to neomultipolarity, it is interesting to note that Grevi appears to provide a 
largely state-centric account of power relations within interpolarity or cooperative multipolarity. 
Similar assertions regarding Grevi’s framework have also been made by Toje.29 Grevi anticipated 
this misinterpretation however: “Interpolarity differs from multipolarity given its focus on the 
challenges of interdependence and it differs from nonpolarity because it puts the accent on the 
relations between large state actors, while not neglecting the importance of transnational 
relations.”30 Grevi’s interpolar framework is therefore locatable in-between traditional state-
centric thought, defended by realists, and Haass’s nonpolarity or Rosenau’s multicentricism. 
Because of this fact, interpolarity is highly adaptive to the evolving characteristics of a changing 
international system.313233 The defining features of Grevi’s multipolarity within interpolarity are 
the intensification of economic globalization, expanding institutions, and shared problems of 
interdependence.  
  
II.  Deepening ‘Existential’ Interdependence  
  
As a concept, interdependence is often linked to globalization, which refers to the 
universalisation and spread of elements such as culture, economic and financial practices, and 
knowledge.40 The universalisation of these elements improves their interchangability inbetween 
                                                             
29 TOJE (A.). Op. Cit., p. 166-169  
30 GREVI (G.). Op. Cit., p. 28  
31 TOJE (A.). Op. Cit., p. 166-167 40  See GILL (S.). Globalization, Democratization and Multilateralism. 
Macmillan Press LTD, Hampshire, 1997, p.  
32 ; WALTZ (K.). “Globalization and Governance”, in: Political Science and Politics. Dec. 1999, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.  




nations and promotes the development of casual relations between states, and between substate 
actors. In time, these relations create process-defined structures which can lead to the increase of 
interdependence at all levels of society.41 Globalization depends heavily on effective governance 
and is therefore heavily influenced by the ease at which these interstate relations can be formed 
and agreements can be reached.42 The spread and development of interdependence through 
international political agreements is what Grevi has defined as ‘structural’ interdependence.43  
 Within the framework of interpolarity, interdependence has deepened to such a degree that it 
has become an ‘existential’ component of the international system. The existential nature of 
interdependence implies that its mismanagement can pose a threat to the political stability of the 
international system as a whole but also to the survival of actors within this system. Mechanisms 
of supply and demand promote increasing specialisation of states and their societies, especially 
with regard to their economies, within this structural interdependence framework. Increased 
specialisation within interdependence leads to an increased structural dependence on other 
actors within the international system and therefore decreases the state’s potential ability to 
independently resolve sector-, state- or system-wide crises.44  With these considerations in mind, 
actors within the interpolar system are required to engage with each other multilaterally 
through means of positive power in order to ascertain that a durable solution to systemic threats 
is developed.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
states. This is also the definition used by the IMF at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm#II  
41  HELD (D.), MCGREW (A.), GODBLATT (D.) & PERRATON (J.). Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics and Culture. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1999 & KEOHANE (R.) & NYE (J.). Power and 
Interdependence. 3rd Edition, Addison-Wesley, New York, 2001  
42  KEOHANE (R.). “Governance in a partially globalized world”, in: KEOHANE (R.). Power and 
Governance in a Partially Globalized World. Routledge, London, 2002, p. 245  
43  GREVI (G.). “The rise of strategic partnerships: between interdependence and power politics”, in: 
GREVI (G.)  
& DE VASCONCELOS (Á). Partnerships for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and  
Russia. Chaillot Paper, Institute for Security Studies, no. 109, May, Paris, 2008, p. 161  
44  MONGIOVI (G.). “Demand, Structural Interdependence, and Economic Provisioning”, in:  American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology. Vol. 70, No. 5, November 2011, pp. 1147-1174; Many of these 
conclusions are based on economic theory or political economy thought. See: FARHAUER (O.) & KRÖLL (A.). 




– going one step beyond regional economics’ specialisation-diversification concept”, in: Jahrbuch für 
Regionalwissenschaft. Vol. 32, No. 1, 2012, pp. 63-84  
Grevi has characterised three intimately interlinked issues which lie at the core of global 
interdependence and which, he believes, will test the stability of the international system in the 
coming decades. These issues are the economy, energy and the environment.34 This is not to 
claim that other contemporary issues are not of global importance. He holds that these issues are 
also global challenges the international system will have to face, but that they are less directly 
consequences of deepening interdependence. At first glance, then, this consideration seems to 
present a weakness in Grevi’s interpolar framework with regard to its ability to incorporate the 
possible agenda-setting effects ‘minor’ issues can have on the international system. However, a 
closer look at his rhetoric reveals his confidence in the problem-solving ability of multilateralism, 
with an emphasis on global summitry, through the use and effects of positive power within the 
interpolar system. The development of extensive multilateral experience allows the international 
system within interpolarity to adapt its structure in order to adequately manage and resolve the 
appearance and reappearance of global issues.35 The interpolar system is able to achieve this 
because it “is interest-driven and problem-oriented, so form should follow function in reforming the 
multilateral order.”36   
  Much of the foundation behind this logic was laid by Nye and Keohane in Power and  
Interdependence in which both authors emphasise the importance of economic factors and  
‘complex interdependence’ as the motivators towards, and reasons for, power interaction.48 
Within an environment of complex interdependence, actors, societies and economies are closely 
connected through norms, rules, processes and institutions. While both authors concede that 
national security and military concerns are still of primary importance in foreign policy agendas, 
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the vast majority of international relations are not concerned with the survival goals of powers.37 
This point is echoed by Grevi: “The actual role of military power as a ‘game changer’ when a 
country seeks to alter the status quo to its advantage is increasingly questionable. Few of the 
political priorities of major powers can be durably achieved by giving primacy to military 
intervention in the broader policy mix.”38   
  
III.  Multilateralism, International Organizations and Summitry  
  
In modern day multipolarity, integration into the world system together with great power 
status and international influence are predicated not just by military force and the ability to use 
it, but in larger measure on the ability to promote sustainable development. This confronts states 
with the need to balance aspirations of world power status with the demands of interdependence 
and the weight of elements of hard and soft power.51 The pressures of interdependence versus 
national interest, and the reality of power distribution within the multipolar system, forces states 
to engage bi- and multilaterally in order to maintain their international influence and to maintain 
their personal welfare within this context.39 Multilateralism is, therefore, the expression of how 
states act upon the reality of the distribution of power within the interpolar system.40   
Recently, authors, such as de Vasconcelos, have argued that the traditional multilateral 
order has become increasingly ineffective within modern multipolarity, Grevi builds on these 
considerations in order to present the central challenge to effective problem-solving within the 
interpolar system: “The fundamental challenge, then, is how to promote a cooperative form of 
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multipolarity in the age of interdependence. In other words, how to reconcile an effective 
multilateral order with a multipolar international system.”41 As the distribution of power shifts 
asymmetrically, new multilateral engagements are required to accommodate these changes. This 
implies that states should favour multilateral structures that are relatively easy to effectively 
adapt to these changes. “The point is that no future multilateral order will be viable if disconnected 
from the transformation of the underlying international system and from the distinctive interests of 
the main powers therein.”42  
  
Grevi argues that within a complex international environment, there is a need to identify 
the key actors and factors shaping developments. As noted above, it is suggested that the major 
global and regional powers will remain the decisive actors within this system. The proliferation 
of new significant global and regional powers implies that their mutual relationships need to be 
redefined.43 Due to the coming challenges the international system will confronted with, it is 
argued that multilateral cooperation will be an inherent, crucial part of the interpolar system. In 
order to be successful, the reform of multilateralism should always reflect and accompany the 
fundamental trends of deepening interdependence and shifts of power and influence.44 The 
introduction of a sense of priorities as a basis for action as well as a sense of pragmatism should 
form the foundation for this evolution. The most successful, established framework for 
multilateral dialogue able to successfully incorporate these considerations in the near future, 
according to Grevi, is the format of summit diplomacy. He is inspired by the apparent prominence 
of the G20 forum in addressing the economic crisis and the increasing visibility of bilateral or 
minilateral summits involving major powers to come to this conclusion. However, intermittent 
coordination at summit level will not suffice to confront the challenges of existential 
interdependence.   
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Summitry must be followed up by the creation of fixed targets, the adoption of clear and 
enforceable rules and their subsequent monitoring.45 Successes that are achieved through bi- or 
minilateral cooperation59 at a lower level of international politics could, in this manner, be 
translated and mainstreamed to the multilateral level.46  
Grevi defines five positive features and three major shortcomings of global summitry. (i)  
First, It reflects the decisive role of major powers in enabling or stifling multilateral cooperation. 
(ii) It is a more flexible format than that of international institutions with broader membership, 
fixed competences and procedures. (iii) It can be applied to different policy domains and 
promote positive issue-linkages among connected dossiers. (iv) It is not geometry dependant. 
And last, (v) it provides a platform for trust-building among the major powers of the interpolar 
system by allowing informal exchanges among their leaders. This allows the opportunity to 
develop personal links and promote mutual respect for priorities and concerns.47  
Conversely, a first major shortcoming of summit diplomacy is the fact that commitments 
often do not translate into action, weakening the credibility of the same forum. A second 
shortcoming revolves around the question of what countries are allowed to attend or not, 
affecting the political legitimacy and practical viability of these summits. Third and last, it is likely 
that summit diplomacy will weaken the authority of already established multilateral frameworks, 
such as the UN.48 These, however, already present serious shortcomings in addressing global and 
regional crises.63 Similar issues have been noticeable within the WTO.64 Consensus, cooperation 
and policy implementation remains a core issue of multilateral frameworks of this type when 
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major powers are not able to come to agreement over issues of national interest and is therefore 
not only characteristic to the summit diplomacy.65 To summarise, international institutions 
consistently fail to solve the problems they were created to address as well as new types of 
problems that arise over time. International institutions can only facilitate cooperation when 
there are common objectives to be achieved.66  
 R. Mitchell has convincingly argued that when international institutions and their hypothetical 
influence on international politics are assessed, considerable attention should be given to both 
membership and design endogeneity. The first involves the claim that countries that join 
international institutions differ systematically differ from those that do not, the latter implies 
that variation in institutional design reflects systematic differences in the underlying structure of 
the problem being addressed.67 Accurately evaluating institutions therefore requires closer 
attention being paid to why states design international institutions as they do, and to why some 
states join and others do not. Mitchell, in effect, proposes a more process- rather than structure-
oriented evaluation of multilateral institutions in order to come to more concrete responses and 
solutions of reform to their ineffectiveness. In order for multilateral diplomacy and summitry to 
succeed under the framework of interpolarity, it is therefore essential for major actors within the 
international system to present and acknowledge new systemic challenges as common and which 
consequently require extensive policy support through the use of positive power.   
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While this is already partially true for international summitry, a stronger recognition needs to be 
developed within the governments of states who participate in multilateral frameworks that 
these issues can be existential, and thus form a threat to their very existence. As the survival of 
the state and the welfare of its citizens are the core goals of the state, cooperation is favourable 
even if the proposed resolution might be in conflict with their present, short-term national 
interests.49  
In order to avoid the development of increasing tensions between the powers of the 
interpolar system with regard to their energy relations, and to avoid a deadlock of the 
international system and a breakdown of those powers’ interlinked societies because of the use 
of negative power, the interpolar framework would proscribe the use of positive power through 
multi- and minilateral diplomacy in order to develop cooperative forms of energy security. This 
might imply a rethinking of energy security frameworks in order to move beyond solely 
concentrating on the national energy interests and security of the individual state, to a form of 
‘societal’ energy security which acknowledges the interlinked and interdependent nature of 
energy relations between multiple states, and the respective consequences a breakdown of 
energy relations could have on these states.69  
  
While the EU is potentially disadvantaged within an interpolar system because it has 
experienced issues in presenting a single voice with respect to international engagements, it is 
also widely considered to be relatively successful in promoting multilateral dialogue, 
humanitarian development and rule of law. The EU might not have a similar degree of  authority 
that states like China and the U.S. possess, but it is still considered to be a crucial global economic 
powerhouse and as a result is not necessarily ‘powerless’.70 The European Security  
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Strategy (ESS) of 2003 aimed to improve the EU’s position as a global negotiator by promoting 
‘effective multilateralism’ as a core concept of EU foreign policy.71 Effective multilateralism puts 
the development of a stronger international society, a well functioning system of international 
institutions and rule-based international order as its objective. The EU’s emphasis on spreading 
effective global governance can transform the Union into a leading actor promoting reform of the 
multilateral system. In effect, the Union has succeeded in positioning itself as a moderator in a 
number of issues and has been a leader in the promotion of sustainable development, the spread 
of rule of law and human rights.72 Crucially, it can present a doorway for the EU to improve and 
demonstrate its capability to successfully work, in the process avoiding the use of ‘hard power’, 
through diplomatic channels.73   
A second potential advantage of the Union, largely underdeveloped by Grevo, is its 
potential ability to present itself as an example of intra- and interregional cooperation in the 
prospect of increasing interdependence as well an example as region-wide issue manager. The 
integration process of the European Union is a ready example of the desecuritization-process of  
‘traditional’ inter-state tensions and the removal of the use of ‘negative power’ states.74 The 
European project steadily expanded into other policy areas and increased its number of member 
states in order ensure stability within the continent.   
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The EU is in fact an early realisation of the development of measures to cope with growing 
European interdependence and globalisation. While Toje argues that Grevi projects a European 
experience on the international system, it is surprising that no further attention is given by Grevi 
to the mechanisms of regional integration as engines of the spread of the use of positive power.50  
  
2. Interdependence and Euro-Russian Energy Security  
  
 I.  EU-Russian mutual energy dependence  
  
 The dependence of the EU on energy imports, particularly of oil and gas, forms the backdrop of 
policy concerns related to the security of energy supplies. The downturn in the primary 
production hard coal, crude oil, natural gas and more recently nuclear energy has led to a 
situation where the EU has become increasingly reliant on primary energy imports to satisfy its 
demand. This dependency has been increasing since 1999, where 45.1% of the EU’s gross inland 
energy consumption was imported from non-member countries to the most recent estimate of 
53.9% in 2009.51 The largest net importers where the most populous member states, with the 
exception of the United Kingdom and Poland (due to their access to indigenous reserves), which 
in turn highlights society’s increasing dependence on energy for its growth.52 In 2009, Denmark 
was the only member state who was able to achieve a negative dependency rate whereas Malta, 
Luxembourg and Cyprus are virtually entirely dependent on primary energy imports.53  
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With regard to imports from Russia, it has been able to maintain a dominant position as 
the largest provider to EU crude oil and gas imports in the past decade. While in 2001, the EU 
imported 25.5% of its crude oil supplies from Russia, this number grew up to 33.2% in 2007, 
with a brief decrease to 31.4% in 2008. The latest calculations estimate that Russia provided 
33.1% of the EU’s crude oil imports in 2009. The small shift of 2008 did not necessary imply a 
decrease in absolute dependence on Russia, it is likely that a relative decrease of dependence on 
Russian gas was the cause of this temporary shift due to the EU’s attempts at diversification with 
existing infrastructure systems. It seems, however, that these attempts had already reached their 
limit by the next year.54 Russia has been able to maintain a relative dominance in oil exports to 
the EU over the past decade. While Norway provided 20.1% of crude oil imports in 2001, it has 
not been able to maintain similar exports rates which resulted in a decline to 15.2% in 2009.   
Natural gas imports present a different trend. Russia has been able to maintain a 
dominant position throughout the past decade, but has steadily been losing this relative 
dominance in favour of imports from Norway. In 2001, Russia provided 47.7% of the EU’s 
imports of natural gas. This number declined steadily to 34.2% in 2009.55 According to Eurostat, 
the security of the EU’s primary energy supplies may be threatened because a high proportion of 
its imports remain concentrated among relatively few partners. 79.1% of the EU-27’s imports of 
natural gas in 2009 came from either Russia, Norway or Algeria. Similar conclusions can be made 
with regard to crude oil and hard coal imports.56 It should be noted here, that while efforts of 
diversification by the EU might have reduced dependence on Russia, the fact that this 
dependence is simply replaced by dependence on another country, such as Norway or Algeria, 
invalidates the genuineness of the diversification.57   
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Conversely, Russia exports one-quarter of its oil production and three-quarters of its 
extracted gas to the EU, with oil and gas together having comprised nearly one-half of Russia’s 
total 2011 exports by value and roughly 13 per cent of its overall GDP.58 The remainders of 
Russia’s oil and gas production are largely consumed within the country itself.59   
It should also be emphasised, as Tekin and Williams noted, that individual member states 
rely on different total energy demands, various mixes of energy sources, and disparate volumes 
of imports and varying ranges of external suppliers.60 An individual or group of countries can 
therefore experience different permutations of dependence which result in varying geopolitical 
implications.61 These factors have hindered the success of EU efforts to develop unity between its 
member states in order to ensure it speaks with one voice on matters of crucial urgency to its 
energy security.87  
  
 II.  A symbiotic relationship of Russian state and energy companies?  
  
While president Yeltsin had promoted the denationalization and privatization of USSR 
state energy companies and supported the formation of joint-stock corporations through the  
1995 loans-for-share scheme, this policy was largely revoked when Putin came to power.62  
Putin’s vision of Russia’s role in the world has been the reinstitution of Russia as a dominant 
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power in the international system through the ideology of ‘sovereign democracy’.63 By 2003, the 
Russian oil sector was dominated by four private companies with the remainder of the 
companies being controlled by the state.64 Through the combined use of re-auctioning oil field 
development rights already auctioned to foreign energy companies and the use of audits, the 
Russian state managed to increase its share in private oil companies from 11.5% in 2004 to 
38.9% in 2007.65 In combination to these evolutions, it is worth noting Russia’s oil exports are 
virtually monopolised by the state-owned Transneft which owns the Russian oil pipelines, while 
Gazprom controls almost 90% of Russian natural gas production and all of the country’s gas 
exports.92  
Gazprom and Transneft have also been heavily involved in expansion to both up- and 
downstream sectors. Gazprom has sought to buy into local storage nodes and distribution 
channels within the EU, such as critical gas storage and transmission points in Austria.66 The aim 
of Gazprom is to capture the profit margins that go to downstream suppliers.67 In the 1990s, 
Gazprom started Wingas in Germany as a joint-venture with BASF-Wintershall which enabled it 
to take a 13% share of the wholesale market. Since then, it has moved into other EU member 
states and has taken advantage of the EU’s energy liberalisation and privatization efforts.68 In the 
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last decade, Gazprom has shown specific interest in strengthening its position in 
westernEuropean states. Several EU-12 states remain fully gas-dependent on Gazprom, which 
owns majority shares of all of their gas monopolies.96 It is clear that, as Finon and Locatelli 
emphasised, Gazprom’s strategy is to maintain its sales in countries that are heavily dependent 
on its gas, through aggressive stock purchasing.69 Similar strategies are noticeable with regard to 
Transneft.70  
         
        Map 1. Eurasian energy pipelines71   
    
A second factor of concern for the EU’s dependence on Russia is the current structure of 
its oil- and gas pipeline network. The physical transit of a majority of the oil and gas imports to 
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the Union runs through pipelines of Belarus and Ukraine. Both transit countries are almost fully 
depended on imports of Russian gas and oil and have “exemplified the difficulty of balancing the 
potentially clashing roles of import-dependent consumer and reliable transit pipeline operator.”72  
However, this dependency works both ways. Gazprom relies for 80% of its gas exports to  
Europe on the Ukraine, making the pipeline a prone target of political or technical failures.73   
Similar aggressive pricing and investment strategies are noticeable with regard to the 
pipeline infrastructure. In January 2007, Transneft halted oil deliveries to Belarus in retaliation 
for a Belarusian failure to accede to Transneft’s demand that it accept higher prices and pay an 
export tariff commensurable to what Belarus was earning from refining Russian oil and 
reexporting it to Europe. This forced European countries dependent on oil from Belarus to resort 
to oil stocks and to pressure both the Belarusian and Russian governments to reinitiate transit of 
oil. The stoppage ended with Belarus’s consent to remit one-third of the normal export duty to 
Transneft in return for suppressing transit fees required of Transneft.74 The following year, a 
similar threat by Gazprom to halt gas shipments to Belarus was resolved by an agreement to 
double Belarusian gas prices over 2006 levels and by giving the company a majority stake in local 
monopoly operator Beltransgaz, thus further expanding Russian influence in the transit 
corridor.75 In 2010, after a series of provocative threats between Transneft and the Belarus 
government, Transneft cut shipments to the Naftan and Mozyr refineries, although EU-bound 
transit supplies continued without disruption.76  
An excessively problematic issue is the Ukraine’s role in sending four-fifths of Russia’s gas 
exports to Europe, ensuring the supply of one-fifth of the EU-27’s collective gas demand.77 The 
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Gazprom gas cut-offs of 2006 and 2009, were a wake-up call to EU officials of the critical nature 
of their energy dependence to Russia. The cut-offs resulted from disputes surrounding Ukraine’s 
accumulated debt for past gas imports, as well as the price it would pay for future imports, and 
the amount that Ukraine would earn in the process as a transit host.78 The fact that the cut-off 
took place in the context of the ‘Orange Revolution’ suggested that the cut-off had a parallel use 
as a political tool and which was deemed “completely unacceptable” by the EU.79 The 2006 crisis 
was resolved partially by the creation of the joint venture UkrGazEnergo, which granted the 
intermediary firm RosUkrEnergo, itself 50% owned by Gazprom, 50% of the Ukrainian market.80 
The joint venture was short lived, however, when a brief cut-off in 2008 forced the Ukrainian 
government to eliminate said company in favour of direct access for Gazprom.81  
These crises have led some EU member states, independent from EU plans, to research 
cooperation measures with Russian companies for alternatives supply venues for oil and gas, 
which, for example, led to Transneft’s expansion of the Baltic Pipeline System’s throughput 
capacity.82 The company has also been pursuing the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline project 
in cooperation with the Italian firm Eni to create a new route that bypasses Turkey’s Bosporus 
Straits.83 Similar projects are underway with regard to gas. Major European energy firms have 
been investing in alternative routes in the hope of gaining a reciprocal share of Russia’s upstream 
sector.  The Nord Stream project which partners major German, Dutch and French energy firms – 
totalling a 49% share – and Gazprom – owning a 51% share – became functional in 2011 and 
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transports up to 55 billion cubic metres of gas per year to EU markets through Germany.84 Since 
the project provides a majority share to Gazprom, the project has been criticized for enhancing 
Russian state influence over Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland and for eliminating their 
respective revenues as transit states. The project is especially a symbol of the remaining 
tendency for EU member states to prefer bilateral and firm interests over EU solidarity, even 
though the project has received support from the European Parliament and Council.85 Smith 
argues, however, that EU acceptance of the project should better be interpreted as the treatment 
of Russia as a benign power, aiming to induce a more cooperative atmosphere in mutual 
relations.86   
The South Steam project, which is currently awaiting its final investment decision and 
would span across the Black Sea to Bulgaria, received similar criticism.87 Russia has currently 
already signed intergovernmental agreements with Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece, Slovenia, 
Austria and Croatia for the purpose of implementing the onshore pipeline section in Europe.88 
Nonetheless, it is questionable whether both projects would truly improve EU energy security, as 
both projects entail a share majority for Gazprom and leave connected countries vulnerable for 
the political and economical implications of a Russian-sided cut-off of energy resources.89 
Diversification of energy imports is also not genuine if dependence context is changed from only 
one access point to multiple access points between the same two countries.  
While Russian energy interests aimed to strengthen their influence within the European 
gas and oil market through the acquisition of majority shares of both up- and downstream 
facilities, Gazprom and Transneft have also attempted to expand to other third-party regions in 
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the hope combating the EU’s ability of diversification through engage with a greater number of 
partners. This has been labelled by Tekin and Williams as the strategy of ‘far encirclement’. In 
short, it “suggests that Gazprom seeks cooperative, coordinative or cooptative relationships with a 
number of NOCs in other key gas producing areas of the world,[...], in order to curtail the nature and 
degree of competition it faces in ‘downstream’ markets.”90 This has especially been the case for the 
Caspian region where, increasingly, non-Russian pipeline routes have come online in an effort of 
countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to avoid the Soviet-era, Gazprom owned, Central 
Asia Centre Pipeline. Consequently, EU efforts to diversify its range of suppliers by accessing 
Caspian gas have been strongly hindered by Gazprom’s utilisation of Moscow’s presence in the 
region.91 The aim of Gazprom and Transneft within the region has been to ensure that energy 
resources, which would normally travel via Turkey to the EU, pass through Russian territory first. 
This method allows Gazprom and Transneft to acquire these resources cheaply and allows them 
to re-export the respective resources at higher price-rates and thus avoid price competition 
elsewhere in Europe.92 Similar efforts have been noticeable in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa.121   
  
The increasing Russian influence within and around Europe have raised fears regarding 
Russia’s ability to use its energy influence as a political tool to influence political behaviour of 
client states, also described as an ‘energy weapon’.93   
As such, this context suggests incredible European energy dependence on Russia which would be 
difficult to describe as interdependent, even if it were to be defined strongly asymmetrical.  
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However, it is necessary to assess whether the Russian energy firms can truly be 
considered to be political tools of the Russian state. While it is true that the energy sector is of 
crucial importance to the Russian state – it was declared so by presidential decree in 200394 – 
three diverging perspectives exist within the academic debate in this regard: First, Gazprom and 
Transneft are truly tools of the Russian state in order to strengthen its respective power within 
the international system and within bilateral engagements. Second, some scholars have argued 
that the opposite is rather true and that both firms are able to act relatively independently from 
the state. And third, an increasing body of scholars have stated that the Russian state-energy firm 
relation is best characterised as being a ‘symbiotic relationship’, where both parties reaffirm and 
play into each other’s interests. This perspective is strongly defended by Bilgin, as he claims that 
that Russia does not consider Gazprom or Transneft as a major impediment to the liberalisation 
of the energy sector, but rather defines the companies as independent with extensive 
contributions to the state.95    
It is understandable that differing views of the relationship between the Kremlin and its 
national energy companies exist, as many of the internal processes between both parties are 
relatively shrouded in mystery. As Smith Stegen noted, “In many ways, Gazprom appears to 
operate as the Russian national gas company: the state earns 8% of its GDP through its 51% 
ownership of Gazprom and has the right,[...], to shake up Gazprom’s management. Moreover, the 
revolving door between the Kremlin and the leadership of Gazprom [...] indicates that Gazprom’s 
decision-makers are acutely aware of the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals.”96 Gazprom, however, 
claims to be an independent commercial company and has attempted public relations initiatives 
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to support this view. These initiatives have only been met with little success.97 Some Russian 
authors, such as Zygar and Panyushkin, have reaffirmed this perspective.98 According to Smith  
Stegen, it is especially the Russian government’s own stance on confirming its power over 
Gazprom that fuels these suspicions.99 In an interview in 2010, Medvedev acknowledged, for 
example, that gas prices were a key issue in the Russian-Ukraine arrangement over the Black Sea  
fleet.100  
According to an official of the European Commission, it is no coincidence that the 
interests of the energy firms and the Russian state are closely connected. While it is true that the 
CEO of Gazprom is politically chosen by the government, he emphasises that both parties have 
very different objectives with regard to domestic gas prices and energy services. Crucial here is 
that both energy firms have had an influx of new people over recent years that have received 
western-styled education, and as a result maintain very different perspectives on both 
international and domestic strategy. The old ‘Communist garde’, which is very geopolitically 
oriented, is slowly disappearing. This has been heavily influential to both Gazprom and  
Transneft’s perspective of priorities abroad and has resulted in a re-evaluation of the role the 
Kremlin’s objectives play in this matter.101  
  
 III.   Forgotten Russian dependency  
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 While Gazprom and Transneft’s strategy of aggressive acquisition of majority shares  of energy-
related companies within Europe has been partly responsible for the increase of EU economic 
dependence on Russian gas and oil, both sectors have failed to modernize its energy 
infrastructure. As the state is forced to deal with a myriad of socioeconomic problems created in 
the post-Soviet era, it has become immensely dependent on Western technology and investments 
to replace and modernize Soviet-era energy infrastructure.102 This has led to worries within the 
EU whether Russia would be able to increase or even maintain its current export rates in the 
coming decades, as the increased exploitation of existing sources in Western Siberia has led to a 
decrease in the region’s reserves.132 Both the oil and gas sectors suffer from inadequate and 
archaic forms of exploration, development and production technology.103 Russia is also faced 
with problems of transportation of energy resources through its pipeline monopolies due to the 
Russian government and companies’ inability to perform frequent repairs and to develop 
additional infrastructure to resolve bottlenecks which hinder smooth supply to the EU. In order 
to respond to growing foreign and domestic demand, heavy investments would be required in 
the Yamal Peninsula. The lack investments implicate that these fields will not produce large 
volumes prior to 2015.134 At present, Gazprom is only allocating 30% of its investments to 
developing production.104 While Russia is also exploring options to the Chinese markets, the 
inability of the Russian and Chinese governments to come to agreement makes it unlikely that 
Russia will be able to export to these markets in the coming decade. As a result, it will remain 
dependent on energy exports to the EU for the foreseeable future.105  
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Gazprom and Transneft’s contract strategies are a second aspect of Russian dependence 
on the EU. The energy market liberalisation initiatives in the EU have resulted in a context where 
spot-market or short-term contracts are increasingly becoming the dominant economic 
interaction due to the increased competitiveness of the energy market. As European energy 
companies are increasingly denationalised, it has become lucrative to engage in short-term deals 
in order to accommodate price fluctuations and market changes.106 While this had already been 
the case for the oil market for some time, both Gazprom and Transneft find it increasingly 
difficult to renew its contracts due to windfalls from energy trade.107 This is largely due to the 
fact that both energy companies, and the Russian government who subsides these companies, 
favour long-term contracts rather than adapting to changes of the characteristics of the 
market.108   
While Gazprom succeeded in contracting with some of the major European gas 
companies in 2006, it was forced to make concessions by decreasing the length of these contracts 
from the previous 30 years to 20-years agreements.109 This situation has resulted in a vicious 
circle wherein the Russian government has put demand rather than supply security110 as the basis 
for its energy relations with Europe: Because of the fact that the Russian government and 
Russian energy companies find it increasingly hard to arrange long-term deals and increasing 
prospective of decreased growth of gas import rates of the EU till 2030,111 the Russian 
government is unwilling to invest in long-term, expensive projects, which would secure future 
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resource supply, and prefers to support demand security through acquisitions in Europe. It has 
also become increasingly wary of EU energy efficiency and supply diversification.112   
Conversely, European players are increasingly aware that the lack of production 
investments in Russia implies a Russian inability to sustain increasing production and export 
rates to meet increasing energy demands in Europe. For this reason, these players are 
increasingly unwilling to engage in long-term contracts with Russian energy firms. Moreover, 
because “the Russian domestic retail market is heavily subsidised, state energy firms,[...], require 
revenue from European and foreign entities, either as customers or joint investors, to maintain and 
upgrade the basic production capacity of Russia’s fields.”144 The lack of Russian investments in 
supply security –and the lack of funds to do so – will decrease its demand security in the 
longterm.113   
There are some signs that the Russian government is becoming increasingly aware of 
these issues. The economic crisis of 2009, and the immense budget deficit it caused, convinced 
the Russian leadership that dependency on energy windfalls would not sustain future economic 
growth. In response, the Russian government launched the Skolkova project in order to attract 
foreign investments for high tech research and production.114 It also announced plans to make  
Moscow an International Financial Centre and most recently finally decided to join the World 
Trade Organization, which would imply a further liberalisation and opening to foreign 
investments of the Russian energy market.   
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These evolutions were hailed by the EU and portrayed as an example of EU-Russian 
cooperation.115 How these evolutions will affect the future of Russian energy security, however, 
remains to be seen.116  
  
 IV.   EU energy policy responses to the energy dependence on Russia  
  
In 2006, Solana, then High Representative for the CFSP, summarised the EU’s context of 
dependency on Russia: “Russia will be the mainstay of [EU] energy imports.”117 In the process, 
Russia was distinguished from other energy partners, which motivated attempts at the 
development of a special, strategic partnership with the country.118 Due to the precarious 
situation of being unable to produce its own energy resources to meet growing energy demands, 
it has become clear to the EU that it is in need of a unified approach to its external energy policy. 
This conclusion was reiterated by the EU presidency in 2007, when it stated that “The 
development of a common approach to external energy policy has to be speeded up, involving 
consumer-to-producer as well as consumer-to-consumer and consumer-to-transit countries, 
dialogues and partnerships through organisations such as OPEC” if it wishes to maintain an 
adequate level of energy security.119 The paper subsequently argued that for this process, the 
negotiation and finalisation of a ‘post-partnership’ and cooperation agreement with Russia, in 
particular with regard to energy issues, would be crucial.  Central to this conclusion is the 
emphasis that is put on the cooperative efforts between both actors as the only solution to shared 
energy issues.   
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The EU institutionally contrasts with Russia at several levels in the field of energy, where 
resource scarcity has motivated effective integration in extended regional energy markets.120 As 
Finon and Locatelli have noted, it contrasts with regard to the variety and complexity of 
relationships between the energy companies and the governmental spheres, both at the level of 
the member states and the EU. Although energy market integration has characterised internal EU 
policy in the past decade, large discrepancies still exist between national markets. A second 
contrast with Russia is with the EU’s lack of classical attributes of a State and means of 
geopolitical power which explains its emphasis on multilateralism within the international 
system.121 To make up for these shortcomings, the EU has resorted to the use of ‘soft power’ and 
the conceptualisation of its dependence in terms of interdependence.154 While energy policy has 
largely remained a competence of the member states, it has recently been redefined as shared 
competence of both the EU and its member states within the Lisbon Treaty. Braun has pointed 
out, however, that mechanisms of solidarity between both level are still particularly weak and 
that, even though cooperation is the central concept for the EU’s foreign energy policy, member 
states still retain a large degree of freedom to act bilaterally, independently from the Union and 
its set goals.122   
  
The start of efforts to promote cooperation between the EU and Russia, and the related 
development of their energy relationship into a ‘partnership’, was the 10-year bilateral 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which came into force in 1997.123 The Agreement 
largely entailed legal arrangements with regard to political dialogue, trade and cooperation in 
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economic matters, justice and home affairs and bilateral cooperation.124 It also addressed the 
need for cooperation and the formulation of energy policy and energy treaties between both 
partners.125 In a sense, the PCA was an acknowledgement that the international system was 
evolving to become increasingly characterised by multipolarity and interdependence, which 
necessitated a strengthening of long-term bi- and multilateral engagements. The PCA also aimed 
at creating spill-over effects by enhancing trade relations on liberal terms in the hope of creating 
a single free trade area between both actors.126   
To the EU, the Energy Charter Treaty formed the institutional foundation of its energy 
security efforts.127 Having entered into force in 1998, its aim was to strengthen the rule of law on 
energy issues, by creating a forum of discussion and a level playing field to be observed by all 
participating governments in the areas of “protection and promotion of foreign energy 
investments, [...] free trade in energy materials, products and energy-related equipment, based on 
WTO rules, [...] freedom of energy transit through pipelines and grids. [...][and] mechanisms for the 
resolution of State-to-State or Investor-to-State disputes”.128 Russia signed the ECT charter in 
1994, but never ratified it, partially due to an early realisation of the political elite in Russia that 
an energy market liberalisation would run counter to the geopolitical goals of the country.129 
Russia’s decision to abandon the ratification was rationalized by their argument that the Union 
was maintaining double standards with regard to Gazprom’s ability to buy EU energy companies. 
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Furthermore, it pointed to the fact that both Norway and Algeria had not signed the 
agreement.130  
  
The liberalisation of the European energy markets has often been criticized because it has 
allowed foreign companies the opportunity to acquire majority shares of major European energy 
firms, in the process securing energy demands.131 Mané-Estrada has pointed out, however, citing 
empirical proof, that these efforts often result in a context where a few number of private firms 
maintain a large degree of market control, leading to decreased energy.165 While the EU wishes to 
continue to promote the liberalisation, it has acknowledged the dangers involved regarding the 
development of these tendencies of monopolisation. In 2000, two initiatives were launched by 
the EU in an effort to counteract these dangers. First, the beginning of the EU-Russian energy 
dialogue was an effort to move beyond the simple producer-consumer relationship and to 
commence a strategic dialogue with the aim of developing a political partnership. Second, the 
start of accession dialogues with Turkey with the hope of adding a major energy transit actor 
which would provide the Union with direct access to a multitude of energy suppliers, allowing it 
to avoid the implications of an EU-Russian political deadlock.132   
As early as 2000, the European Commission Green Paper had warned of the dangers of 
increasing energy demand and the respective danger to European energy security.133 In the same 
year, an agreement was reached to initiate a regular Energy Dialogue with the aim of ensuring an 
energy partnership between both actors. The following ‘First Synthesis Report’ of  
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2001 set the improvement of a legal basis for energy production and transportation,   
ensuring the physical security of transport networks, improving legal security for long-term 
energy supplies and the recognition of certain new transport infrastructures as ‘common 
interests’ and highlighted importance of rational energy use and savings as its priorities.134 
According to the Dialogue-report, subsequent meetings of the ‘Permanent Partnership Councils’, 
dedicated to energy issues, resulted in a better understanding of both actors of the 
characteristics and functioning of respective energy markets.135 If we are to believe the report, 
this is a clear example of mid-profile efforts undertaken by both actors to develop bilateral 
experience through regular mini-summits, supporting the bigger annual summits; in turn, 
stabilising political relations between both actors.136   
  
Even though cooperative dialogues were underway, Baev argued that two major shifts in 
the character of ‘securitization’ of energy matters within the Europe were noticeable in the 
middle of the past decade. The first involved the rise of natural gas as the most politically 
prominent type of energy within Europe. The second involved the key role the EU started playing 
in shaping the energy debates globally through the gradual spread of the ECT.171 This process 
was also noticeable in the increased efforts of the Union to extend its cooperation agreements 
with Russia, Norway, Algeria, OPEC and the Gulf-Cooperation Council. A second element of these 
efforts consisted of increased efforts of the EU to integrate energy aspects to its CFSP policies and 
engagements with third parties.  In October 2005, the EU signed an energy treaty with South 
Eastern Europe, which fastened its integration into the Single Energy Market and provided 
prospects of expanding Europe’s energy infrastructure to Turkey and the Middle East.172 
Following the energy treaty of 2005, the Commission further intensified its cooperative relations 
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with the Caspian Basin, Mediterranean Region, Norway, Ukraine and even with other regions of 
the world in an effort to ensure possibilities for future oil and gas supply networks, thus 
decreasing the prospect of future dependence on Russia.137   
The two shifts were precipated, however, by the 2006 Ukraine crisis which threatened EU 
member states’ energy supplies. According to an EC official, the crisis had an immense impact on 
the way the European institutions engaged with matters of European energy security. While the 
EU had obviously recognised the dangers of its energy situation before, some of the progress 
achieved with regard to Russia had come to a stall.138 The crisis resulted in a considerable 
acceleration of EU energy policy efforts, specifically with regard to the creation and expansion of 
the Single Energy Market, the development of a single voice with regard to energy matters as well 
as with regard to its foreign energy policies. However, a fact, often overlooked by the literature, is 
that the EU also increasingly became aware that the energy market was globalising and that 
increasing global cooperation would be required to ensure stable energy supplydemand 
networks.139 This resulted in the rapid development of the mid-2006 Green Paper which 
prescribed greater orientation of member-states policies toward common goals,176 as well as the 
goal of widening the European energy market to include its neighbours and to bring them 
progressively closer to the EU’s internal market.177 These factors, in turn, resulted in the October  
2006 concept paper and action plan for the Informal European Council in Finland.140 The 
Commission and the Council reasoned that before an effective external energy policy could be 
created, further integration of the internal energy market and a deepening of internal energy 
policies were required.179   
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A growth of internal coherence would then be projected to the international community as an 
example of the European Union as speaking “with the same voice”,141 and would increase its 
political gravitas internationally within bi- and multilateral frameworks.142   
While the European Commission acknowledged the legitimate use of bilateral energy 
dialogue of member states with Russia, it emphasised that a collective EU-level policy is a moral 
and political necessity. It followed this argument with the launch of ‘An External Policy to Serve 
Europe’s Energy Interests’ by the European Commission in an effort to promote the embedment 
of energy security into wider EU foreign policy, including the CFSP.143 The paper acknowledges 
the interdependent nature of the energy sector of the EU and Russia, and reemphasises the need 
to work “towards a comprehensive agreement with Russia covering all energy products. The aim 
should be integration of the EU and Russian energy markets in a mutually beneficial, reciprocal, 
transparent and non discriminatory manner.”144   
However, as the 2006 Green Paper defined ‘diversification’ and ‘liberalization’ as the EU’s 
core guidelines for the development of energy policy, each containing a certain number of 
implied tasks “going beyond the limit of common economic good”,145 it became clear that the 
European Commission was simultaneously concerned with measures to diversify gas imports 
towards North-Africa, due to the political unreliability of Russia as well as its apparent will to use 
its energy dominance as a political weapon.185 Its renewal of liberalization efforts added 
constraints with regard to the ability of Russian energy firms to acquire stocks in Europe, and 
was aimed to reduce Gazprom and Transneft’s ability to expand into the EU energy market. 
These measures resulted in increased political tensions between both actors.186   
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Ironically, a closer look into EU-Russian energy relations reveals that both parties have 
continued to maintain very good working-level relations between the Commission and the 
Russian Ministry of Energy. According to an EC official, this has been the case on all levels of the 
bureaucracy – up to the level of the Directorate-General and the Commissioner, and the Russian 
energy minister and deputy-minister– throughout the past decade. However, these relations are 
often fall victim to tensions in the general political relations between both actors, where issues of 
distrust and differing interests are more apparent.187  
  
In an effort to decrease these strains, new talks were initiated to promote cooperation in 
2007, following the end of the first PCA agreement. The principles on energy security agreed at 
the G8 Summit were strongly reflected within these talks. No agreement was reached, however, 
and the PCA agreement was extended for another year, though negotiations were later resumed 
in 2008 in the tense context of the Georgian war.188 In 2007, a new ‘Energy Policy for Europe’ had 
already been legislated by the European Parliament, which was later detailed in the 2007 Energy 
Action Plan (EAP) and the 2008 Second Strategic Energy Review (SSER) followed by a series of 
directives.189 The central proposition of these directives was to reduce the consumption of all 
primary energy resources by 20% by the year 2020.  After the EAP, the EU was confronted with 
two major challenges.   
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First, there was a large public debate ongoing with regard to the ‘historic agreement on climate 
change’ of the Spring Summit regarding, potentially threatening “the balance within the energy 
triangle between security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability”. 146  Second, the EU 
governments had failed to agree upon a common strategy towards Russia. This had allowed 
Russia to continue its strategy of ‘bilateralisation’ of energy partnerships with various European 
countries.191  
The SSER highlighted the improved, but still insufficient solidarity that existed with 
regard to energy policy between the 27 member states.192 It expresses the continuing belief in the 
EU’s ability to consolidate mutual trust among all relevant actors through “legally binding, albeit 
elusive, long-term agreements that can also assure an environment conducive to heavy-duty 
investments” related to energy resource extraction and transportation.147 The European external 
energy policy, therefore, extends beyond supply security and the establishment of amicable 
relations with major producers and transit countries, as it encourages bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation and attempts to widen the geographical coverage of its internal policy 
arrangements.148 It should be noted that the EU has repeatedly promoted energy cooperation in 
multilateral frameworks such as the UN, the IEA and the G8 and that it considers the 
institutionalisation of cooperation on energy issues, preferably through the framework of 
effective multilateralism, as a crucial aspect of its external energy policy framework. Central in 
this regard, is the pursuit of its goal to create an external energy policy based on 
interdependence, cooperation and mutual trust with international partners.195   
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Since the SSER, bilateral energy relations between the EU and Russia appear to have 
stabilised and have put a stronger emphasis on the development of cooperative frameworks 
between both players. The crisis of 2009, for example, led the EC, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine to agree on the installation of an Early Warning Mechanism as well as ‘Technical Terms 
for Monitoring the Supply of Natural Gas’ through Ukraine in order to ensure the stable supply of 
gas between the three actors.196 And while the fourth international conference of 2009 was 
characterized by mutual recriminations, president Medvedev immediately attempted to 
deescalate tensions by emphasising the need for a new legal framework between both actors.197 
The EU and Russia have also maintained their tradition of meeting twice a year through bilateral 
summits, which has recently resulted in the first steps towards the development of a ‘Roadmap of 
the EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050’, of which the Common Understanding was signed 
in 2011.198 The roadmap aims to include an analysis of various scenarios and their impact on EU-
Russian energy relations as well as on specific sectors such as oil and gas. The aim is to elaborate 
on long-term opportunities and risks posed to these sectors, as well as overall longterm 
opportunities and risks to energy supply and demand, and to investigate whether there is 
potential for long-term cooperation on efficient energy technologies and research.199   
The First Progress Report on the Roadmap, interestingly enough, puts emphasis on 
EURussian policy synergy with regard to prospects of the development of a single electricity grid, 
and emphasises that a stronger cooperation with regard to the implementation of efficient 
energy policies, such as those outlined by the EU’s ENERGY 2020 and the EU 2050 Energy  
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199  Ibidem, p. 2-3  
Roadmap.149150 The positive move of EU-Russian energy relations in the context of the EU-Russia 
Roadmap is also echoed by the EC official, as he stated that the “Over the past years, we’ve largely 
been doing crisis management. There’s a lot of uncertainty, but for the EU, it is slowly becoming 
relatively clear what direction to go”.151   
  
3. EU-Russian energy security under the prism of interpolarity  
  
EU and Russian energy security relations as nascent children of interpolarity?  
  
Having reviewed the EU’s external policy with regard to its energy security relation with  
Russia, following a description of the context of interdependence which characterises the 
European and Russian energy markets situation, a series of solid conclusions can be made 
regarding both powers’ preparedness for future context of interpolarity.  
As Grevi noted, the interpolar system will be characterized by an increasing ‘existential’ 
interdependence of the powers of the international system. The European and Russian energy 
market are integrated to such a degree that it renders both powers unable to pursue short-term 
policies to diversify or radically change their energy dependency. With regard to the EU, this is 
largely due to geographical and historical factors. Simply put, the EU currently does not have the 
energy infrastructure available to completely eliminate its energy dependence on Russia.  
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However, as we have shown, this does not imply that longer term efforts are not under way. The 
Nabucco pipeline project brings with it the prospects of gas import sans influence of Russia. The 
prospects of a Turkish accession to the EU, however unlikely currently, could greatly improve the 
political and economical strength of the EU with regard to energy security within the region.  
While this option seems an ideal solution, it would also introduce new strategical and geopolitical 
risks to the Union.152 Alternatively, the EU has increasingly been able to rely on Norwegian 
imports to diversify its energy supply profile. It currently plays an essential role as a partner and 
allows a more easy and straightforward relationship due to the presence of “European values”.153 
Nonetheless, it does not have enough resources to fully support the EU through export.154 A third 
factor of problematic nature to the EU is the fact that most of the Eastern member states lack the 
necessary energy transportation infrastructure to allow energy imports from any other actor 
than Russia.155  
From Russia’s part, it is faced with similar issues as the EU. The Soviet-era has left the 
country with a legacy energy pipeline network which was almost completely oriented towards 
European exports. As a result, should it wish to diversify its range of countries to export to, it will 
need to invest in new high-capital projects to develop pipeline systems over long distances to 
other regions of the world. As noted earlier, it is currently in the process of negotiating such 
projects with Asian countries such as China, although the progress is slow in this regard.156 
Furthermore, the Russian government is heavily reliant on revenues from the energy sector for 
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the social and economical development of the country. Russian energy firms rely heavily on their 
ability to seal long-term contracts with European partners should they, in cooperation with the 
Russian government, intend to modernise and improve the Russian energy infrastructure 
network.   
With the Partnership for Modernisation agreement, it appears that the Russian government is 
finally planning to prioritise and subsidise supply security rather than the strategy of demand 
security.157158  
As such, we can conclude that existential interdependence with regard to energy is clearly 
apparent between both powers. Moreover, this interdependency has also been clearly recognised 
throughout nearly all of the European external energy policies over the last decade, as well as in 
many of the Summit dialogues between both parties. Interdependency lies at the core of the 
energy relations between the EU and Russia and is recognised as being of such importance, that it 
can potentially threaten the welfare of both countries. This was recently again emphasised as an 
essential factor within most future scenario’s outlined in the first report to the EU-Russia 2050 
Energy Roadmap.208  
  
With regard to the acknowledgement of the developing cooperative multipolar 
international system within the European external energy policy, two specific points should be 
made. First, the EU has long held the belief that the international system was inherently 
multipolar, which was again emphasised in the ESS.159 It has put the principles of effective 
multilateralism and cooperative behaviour on the international scale as its core principles of 
international engagement. Its strong desire to lead multilateral conferences is an essential 
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example of this behaviour. The reasoning behind this logic is that the EU believes that it can 
become stronger within the framework of cooperating with other multilateral institutions.160 
This logic of ‘effective multilateralism’ aims to provide the EU with a normative justification for 
its actions abroad as well as a degree of recognition of its presence as an international power 
within the international system.161 Next to the recognition of interdependence, an emphasis on 
cooperation has been a major element of the EU’s energy policies with regard to Russia and has 
been repeatedly reiterated since the start of the PCA agreement to the recent conclusion of the 
Partnership for Modernisation.  
Similar efforts have recently been noticeable with regard to Russia’s energy policies. As 
Russia has no alternative markets available and Gazprom and Transneft are finding it 
increasingly difficult to play the European markets to their advantage, it seems that the Kremlin 
has been more forthcoming to the EU’s aspirations and wishes within the European market.212 
While the development of the Nord and South Stream can be viewed from the perspective of EU 
energy diversification as a threatening evolution, the fact that both projects received support 
from the European institutions and the fact that the Russian energy firms strongly cooperated 
with European energy firms and governments for the development of these projects, can attest to 
some goodwill to cooperate rather than to use cooptive measures, regardless of whether the 
Russian firms had alternatives available or not. This is not to say that an idealistic perspective of 
these projects necessarily presents a complete picture. Equally important is the fact that Russian 
state is still in the process of redefining itself as an actor within the multipolar system, following 
the breakdown of the Soviet state, and as such can be receptive to cooperative measures to 
further its position as a power within the international system.213  
Second, it is clear that both actors maintain a degree of caution and possibly even distrust 
towards each other. Proedrou accurately describes the situation when he states: “the high degree 
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of sensitivity of both sides forces them to take up measures that will reduce their sensitivity. Russia 
endeavours to appropriate the Caspian energy, obstruct alternative sources and routers, circumvent 
transit countries and thus lock its presence in the EU market. The Union,[...], uses liberalisation and 




policies, and attempts to diversify away from Russia”.162 Negative power usage has therefore been 
very much part of the EU-Russian energy security context in the past decade. However, more 
importantly, because of their mutual high vulnerability, EU-Russian energy dialogue has always 
been forced to return to the principles of cooperative engagement and the use of positive power 
efforts to improve their security situation and to develop a cooperative form of security. As Grevi 
made clear, the use of negative power results in deadlocks within the international system and 
permeates the development of crises in the fields where that power is used. To put it bluntly, an 
energy crisis due to a political deadlock between Russia and Europe would be disastrous to the 
economic, social and political welfare of both powers and is therefore not an option.  
  
Why, then, has the use of negative power frequently made a reappearance within this 
context? According to an EU official, this is largely due to the fact that EU-Russian energy 
relations are heavily susceptible to political crises in other policy areas. This can consequently be 
problematic for efficient dialogue and policy creation. Currently, the EU and Russia are still in the 
process of better understanding each other’s interests and to define strategies that can prove 
beneficial to both powers. This runs contrast to the bureaucratic relations public servants of 
both actors maintain. As described earlier, the institutions and governments of both actors 
maintain very close relations with each other and are able to continue the development of 
cooperative policies in spite of higher-level political relations. This factor, which is largely 
overlooked by the literature, is part of the reason why both actors have been able to continue to 
progress towards cooperative partnerships and treaties with relative ease.215  
A second factor minimising the effects of intermittent negative power usage is the 
development of a tradition of summitry with regard to energy relations between both powers.   
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Working groups of the Commission meet twice per year with the Ministry of Energy and 
maintain frequent contact in-between these events.163 Additionally, in the framework of the 
Energy Dialogue, three Thematic Groups discuss specific aspects of energy policy cooperation by 
meeting twice a year, after which Joint Reports are issued on a yearly basis.217 With regard to 
general EU-Russian relations, which also include energy security topics, high-level summits take 
place on an average of twice per year basis.164 These and other examples aim to stabilise energy 
relations between both actors by providing opportunities of reciprocal information sharing 
regarding both powers’ interests and frustrations and develops bilateral experience. EU-Russian 
energy dialogue can therefore be characterised as highly fluid and adaptable and, should 
considerable progress be made in the coming years, could serve as an example case of the 
success of bilateral engagements through summits. Due to the limitations of this dissertation, it 
is unclear, however, to what regard both Russia and the EU use the experience developed from 
their energy engagements on the global, multilateral level. Further positive evolutions are 
noticeable. For example, the sixth World Future Energy Summit will gather of the world’s energy 
leaders in the hope of addressing future systemic challenges. Further research on the relative 
positions of the EU and Russia within these arenas could provide a better understanding of the 
influences of their bilateral summitry on their policies on the global stage.165  
  
Interpolarity provides an adequate conceptual framework to analyse present and recent 
evolutions within the field of energy security between Russia and the European Union. While it is 
clear that ‘we are not there yet’, some of the recent economical and political trends between both 
actors do indicate that interdependence is increasingly driving political behaviour resulting in 
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the realisation that cooperative frameworks of security might provide a solution to both powers’ 
individual energy security considerations.   
However, it should be emphasised that the framework of cooperation between both powers at 
this stage is still of a nascent nature and that further strengthening of the institutional relations 
between both powers will be required in order to ascertain the development of interpolarity. 
Several core issues, which lay outside of the limits of this dissertation, will also strongly 
influence these developments. For example, within the foreseeable future, the EU, Russia and  
Turkey will have to come to terms regarding the energy policies the three actors wish to pursue. 
It is increasingly becoming clear that Turkey is taking advantage of both powers’ energy security 
concerns without making strong commitments to either side.166 If the three actors wish to avoid 
future conflict and political deadlock in this matter, effective dialogue, possibly through 
summitry, will be required.167  Another issue of concern are the implications of strategic 
tensions with regard to energy resource extraction in the Arctic region on global (energy) 
relations. Multiple global powers have expressed specific interests in the region.168   
Regarding the prospect for the European Union as an energy actor under interpolarity, it 
will be crucial for the institutions to further develop methods of solidarity between the member 
states in order to improve the Union’s ability to engage bi- and multilaterally with a ‘single 
voice’. This has remained a core goal of the EU throughout the past decade. Yet, progress will be 
difficult as the European institutions are currently suffering the effects resulting from a 
decreased budget due to the economic crisis. DG ENER was already unable to focus on essential 
partners, such as cooperation initiatives with the Sub-Saharan region, South-America, Asia and 
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international organisations apart from the IEA, in the past decade and is facing further 
reductions of staff in the coming years.169   
It is imaginable that the other institutions will be facing similar reductions. Similarly, little 
progress has been made regarding the development of a common energy negotiator to 
strengthen Europe’s bargaining power. Within the short term, it is unlikely that the European 
Union will achieve much progress, on the one hand, in this matter. Nor, on the other, regarding 
its ability to develop a common external energy policy as long as the energy profiles of its 
member states remain diverse and the eastern member states are largely energy dependent on 
Russia. In the meantime, it is likely that bilateral diplomacy by member states will remain used, 
even though this might undermine EU-level efforts.170  
Following the development of a single foreign energy policy, the EU’s emphasis should 
lie, considering its accumulated experience on the bilateral level, on the support of global 
multilateral initiatives and institutions within the field of energy in order to strengthen its 
position as a global energy player in this context. This, in turn, could allow the EU to have an 
increased political leverage within diplomacy on the lower levels of international relations. A 
further development and adaption of its strategy of effective multilateralism could prove a useful 
tool with these aims in mind.171  
  
To conclude, having extensively analysed the EU-Russian energy security context, it has 
become clear that European external energy policies can clearly be characterised as containing 
many of the elements required for the successful survival of both powers within the context of 
an interpolar international system. As such, it can be argued that the manner by which the EU 
behaves with regard to its external energy security can be seen as a part of the process of 
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transformation of the international system from uni-multipolarity to interpolarity proper. It is 
my belief that both the question of ‘the EU as an actor within interpolarity’ and ‘the signs of the 
development of an interpolar system in the case of EU external action’ are inherently interlinked.   
As Grevi emphasised, the interpolar system is process-based and interest-driven and leaves 
rooms for powers within this system to develop the most effective responses, through the use of 
positive power, to the problems they are confronted with or that threaten the international 
system.172 The EU has clearly put effort into the development of a common understanding of the 
energy security problem with Russia – this is the core purpose of the 2050 Energy Roadmap – 
and is already in the process of developing legitimate solutions, in cooperation with Russia, to 
these issues. On the other hand, a system-wide evolution of international relations towards a 
context of interdependent multipolarity can also put pressure on the EU to develop measures 
and tools that are effective within this evolving context. Further research on the appearance of 
interpolar framework elements in other areas of EU external policy areas will be required to 
make definite statements in this regard. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that, as a 
supporter of cooperative multilateralism and multipolarity, the EU has the opportunity to gain 
substantial political clout and to develop itself as an important global power within the 
interpolar system, should it succeed at further unifying its external policies and to represent 
itself with a ‘single voice’.227  
  
    
Conclusion  
  
 This dissertation has undertaken two distinct approaches to the question of the EU as an actor 
within the scenario of interpolarity and the implication of EU-Russian energy relations on an 
interpolar system. The first approach consisted of a deconstruction of the interpolar framework 
in order to better understand the specificities of Grevi’s argument. Secondly, a detailed image 
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was presented of EU-Russian energy relations of the past decade, which was further 
complemented a thorough overview of the economic nature of these relations, in order to argue 
that both powers are indeed existentially interdependent. Within the first chapter, I have argued 
that interpolarity can be characterised as being part of a broader trend which I termed as ‘neo-
multipolarity’. It became clear that Grevi’s efforts of re-evaluating the role of states and their 
relations is part of a recent trend of authors to describe and integrate the dynamics of what 
Rosenau defined as ‘postindustrial interdependence’ and globalization.173 Grevi’s emphasis on 
experiences gained from bi- and multilateral contacts of powers within the international system, 
preferably through the form of summitry, as a driver of redefinition and change of structures of 
the international system, hints that he was influenced by Wendt. Wendt asserted that 
multipolarity should be defined by process rather than structure in order to increase the 
prospects of multipolar peace.229 This implies that cooperative assistance and interaction, rather 
than anarchy, becomes the driver of the international system. According to Grevi, this is the case 
because there is no hope for the survival of actors within the international system if these solely 
engage in foreign affairs through the use of negative power. As such, powers are currently slowly 
starting to acknowledge that, while the use of negative power might lead to short-term gains, 
due to the existential and widespread nature of interdependence, their actions can have severe 
consequences to their own welfare as well.   
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The interlinked nature of societies across the world therefore forces powers towards the 
use of cooperative means in international relations. This has clearly been the case for EURussian 
energy relations. The theoretical foundation supporting this logic was developed by Nye and 
Keohane. According to both authors, the closely connected nature of actors, societies and 
economies within the environment of complex interdependence, leads to the development of 
norms, rules, processes and institutions, which result in the increasing importance of policy 
areas other than national security and military concerns within multilateral frameworks.174 In 
this regard, Grevi leaves room for the evolution of new forms of multilateral engagements on the 
global stages, though he proposes that, of the current used forms of multilateralism, summitry is 
most likely the most effective means to facilitate effective cooperation and policy 
implementation. The question which remains unanswered within Grevi’s framework is whether 
existential interdependence and globalization as a core characteristic of the international system 
also implies that cooperative measures will dominate international affairs. While his work puts a 
large emphasis on systemic crises as the drivers and facilitators of cooperation, it seems he has 
left considerable room with regard to when exactly an issue is to be considered of ‘systemic’ 
nature. Continuing this thought, what degree of cooperation will smaller, less important issues 
facilitate within interpolarity? These questions remain unanswered and will require further 
development of the framework. However, this runs the risk of leaving the framework 
inadaptable to less expected evolutions. As such, interpolarity is also a victim of the eternal 
struggle between ‘being too vague’ and ‘being too specific’ to be usable.  
  
The second and third chapter made clear that existential interdependence is driving 
EURussian energy affairs and has been doing so for the last decade. To a certain degree, this has 
been acknowledged by both actors, creating a certain will towards the development of 
cooperative relations and cooperative security between both actors. These evolutions, however, 
are heavily susceptible to political turbulence. As the Ukraine and Belarus examples showed in 
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chapter two, direct short-term economic or political interests can come in the way of 
simultaneous cooperative efforts between both actors. Furthermore, the economic and political 
initiatives of both actors show a paradoxal trend, emphasising both long-term cooperation and 
short-term national security interests as core policy goals. I would argue that, within the context 
of the interpolar framework, these trends represent the struggle of both the EU and Russia to 
come to terms with short-term negative power attractiveness versus longer term positive power 
as policy choices. This struggle, as such, can hint at the process of early 
interpolaritydevelopment in the international system as described by Grevi.175  
Recent political evolutions do show a positive trend in EU-Russian energy relations 
towards a desire to put a larger emphasis on the use of positive power. Much will depend, in this 
regard, on their ability to transform cooperative experiences from the bilateral level to the global 
arena. In 2009 EU-Russia Energy Relations review by the EU-Russia Centre, Piebelags, Energy 
Commissioner of the EC, concludes that “Russia is a very important European partner and 
considering the existing interdependence in the energy sphere it will remain so in the next decades”, 
as such “The EU and Russia have join interests in building a long-term strategic energy 
partnership” to develop a context of cooperation, confidence and mutual trust to ensure 
longterm security and predictability to both sides.232 Following the EU-Russian Summit of June 
2010, European Council President Van Rompuy reiterated on these desires by stating that “With 
Russia we don’t need a reset. We want a fast-forward.”176   
  
This desire for progress on both sides is largely due to the fact that the Russian 
government, in 2010, experienced a turn-around on its policies with regard to some areas of its 
energy policy in several areas.   
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First, the Russian government finally acknowledged energy efficiency as a key area of 
improvement in Russia and is aiming for European assistance in this matter. Second, Vatansever 
argues that it is fair to conclude that the Russian leadership is finally starting acknowledge the 
need for foreign investments in developing its hydrocarbons industry as its largest gas fields are 
currently in decline and strongly need modernization. Third, Gazprom is increasingly faced with 
a changing European gas market where a decline in gas demand has coincided with a substantial 
growth of gas-trade on spot markets.177 The 2010 summit also resulted in the creation of the 
‘Partnership for Modernization’, which puts the goal of improving EU-Russian energy security 
and energy modernization as two of its core issues.178 In December 2011, following the 28th 
EURussian Summit, President Van Rompuy reiterated the EU’s desire to become a partner of 
Russia in the 21st century: “In many ways we are strongly interdependent. In a spirit of mutual 
benefit we can only win by deepening our cooperation even further.”179 Russia’s WTO-accession is 
presented as a major step forward towards the further development of the New Agreement and 
the Energy Dialogue with Russia.180 On the progress made at the same summit, Commission 
President Barrosso commented that “a reliable, transparent and rules-based energy framework 
applying to all operators, remains a key priority for the EU. We have very strong common interests 
with Russia, in energy and in many other fields”.238   
  
Finally, a last significant sign of improving energy relations and the continuation of 
cooperative bilateral dialogue can be seen by the presence, for the first time, of the Russian 
Deputy Energy Minister Yanovsky, at a European Parliament 2012 conference titled 
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‘Strengthening EU-Russia Energy Relations’. Within the conference, Yanovsky stated that “both 
Russia and the EU must do everything possible to put [their respective energy policies] to the best 
use for the benefit of their peoples. It does not mean that success in this area can be achieved 
without consistent and sometimes difficult reciprocal steps.”181 The ability of both actors to 
overcome these hurdles in the context of the potential development of interpolarity will 
constitute the major challenge facing both the EU and Russia in the coming decades.  
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